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The Jacksonian Makings of the Taney Court

Daniel Webster in 1841 warned Whig associates that the Supreme Court was likely to
declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the
Congress.1 This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close associate
of Justice Joseph Story, and justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of
judicial sentiments on the issues of the day.2 Even if Webster lacked first hand knowledge of
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how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national
bank, his knowledge of the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig
pessimism. Jacksonian politics, the Jacksonian politics of judicial selection, and the politics of
the Jacksonians on the federal bench gave good reason for supposing that Taney Court majorities
would be hostile to a national bank and to any other prominent Whig initiative thought to be
grounded in a “latitudinous” construction of federal power. Most Jacksonians vigorously
opposed the national bank on both policy and constitutional grounds. The most vigorous
opponents of that institution had been appointed to the Taney Court. The partisan activities of
these justices while on the federal bench gave little reason for hope that Taney Court majorities
would separate law from politics when deciding a case raising those constitutional questions that
divided their Jacksonian sponsors from their Whig rivals.
Webster’s fear that McCulloch was in imminent danger of being overruled or
substantially narrowed suggested earlier Whig fears had been alleviated, that the Supreme Court
would not abandon judicial power altogether. The Taney Court’s first decisions,3 combined with
much anti-judicial rhetoric in Congress and state legislatures during the 1820s by politicians
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closely identified with the Jacksonian revolution,4 fostered impressions that a Jacksonian bench
would in the name of democratic majoritarianism routinely sustain any federal or state law under
constitutional attack. Proponents of a strong federal judiciary were convinced that Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee5 and other precedents supporting judicial review of state legislation would
shortly be overruled. Even Marbury v. Madison seemed practically doomed in the long run.
”There will not, I fear,” Justice Story wrote Justice McLean in 1837, “ever in our day, be any
case in which a law of a State or of Congress will be declared unconstitutional.”6
Influenced by Story’s understanding of Jacksonian politics, twentieth century
commentators have seen the subsequent willingness of Taney Court majorities to declare laws
unconstitutional as proof that the justices on that tribunal abjured Jacksonian partisanship upon
taking the bench. Charles Warren, in particular, insisted that the judicial willingness to impose
contract clause, commerce clause and other constitutional limitations on the powers of state
governments demonstrated the continued vitality of a healthy separation of law and politics on
the antebellum judiciary.7 Webster’s adjusted understanding of Jacksonian politics varies the
body of the argument for judicial independence, but not, apparently, the punchline. The
Massachusetts Senator feared that the Jacksonian dominated Taney Court would exercise judicial

4

Longaker, pp. 341-42.

5

14 U.S. 304 (1816).

6

Justice Story to Justice McLean, May 10, 1837, p. 272

7

See footnote above.

4
power with gusto, declaring unconstitutional such vital Whig initiatives as the national bank.
Marbury was safe, in his view, only because the more important McCulloch precedent was in
jeopardy. From this Websterian perspective, therefore, the Taney Court’s failure to declare
certain limits on federal power better demonstrates that tribunal’s capacity to separate
constitutional law from partisan politics than various decisions declaring state laws
unconstiutional.
Webster’s judicial fears had better political grounding that Story’s concerns. By the time
Jacksonians had established firm control over the federal judiciary, Whigs had far more reason to
worry that the justices would strike down controversial exercises of national power than abandon
judicial review. Political coalitions that vigorously attack judicial review when out of power
have often become enthusiastic devotees of that practice when in power. Why, after all, should
astute politicians maintain that a branch of government controlled by their coalition is duty
bound to sustain all policies made by other political institutions, some of which may be
controlled by rival forces?8 Jacksonians proved no exception to this historical tendency. As
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early as 1830, President Jackson and many prominent supporters were articulating pro-judicial
sentiments. This pro-judicial strand in Jacksonian rhetoric became stronger as Jacksonian jurists
increasingly dominated the federal bench. By the 1850s, prominent Jacksonians were looking to
expand the jurisdiction of federal courts and enthusiastically championing judicial supremcy.
The judicial selection process in the three decades before the Civil War further demonstrates
Jacksonian support for judicial review. Most of the justices on the Taney Court had publicly
defended the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional before being appointed to the
federal bench. With the notable exception of Philip Pendleton Barbour, no Jacksonian judicial
nominee was associated with the political attacks made on the federal judiciary during the
debates over whether to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the statutory provision
that licensed most judicial review of state legislation. The continued survival of Marbury,
Martin, and the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional, therefore, does not represent a
triumph of law over politics.
The willingness of Taney Court justices to declare particular state laws unconstitutional
similarly represents no triumph of law over politics. Jacksonians insisted that the power of the
federal government was limited, but were equally insistent that the federal government was
supreme within those limits. State rights did not extend to nullification or personal liberty laws.
Indeed, Jacksonian proposals for expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts were intended to
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ensure that local actors did not unconstitutionally interfere with the exercise of legitimate
national powers over the tariff and slavery. Leading Jacksonians also exhibited no rigid
preference for state power on constitutional matters that did not directly involve limiting federal
power. Opinions in antebellum America on the proper scope of such provisions as the contracts
clause almost always depended more on the particular interests involved in the case before the
court than on the depth of any previous commitments to state rights. Jacksonians appointed to
the supreme court had similarly exhibited no rigid preference for state rights when no
corresponding limit on federal power was involved. Jacksonian judicial nominees before joining
the federal bench had uniformly demonstrated strong public support for Jackson’s militantly
nationalistic, anti-state rights positions and proposals during the nullification crisis. None had
publicly championed lifting or narrowly interpreting all the constitutional prohibitions on state
power set out in Article I, Section 10. Barbour was the only justice who in his previous political
incarnation consistently supported the state rights positions on constitutional issues that did not
raise questions of federal power.
The Taney Court’s apparent failure to declare federal laws unconstitutional, however,
does seemingly represent both a major triumph of law over politics and a dramatic refutation, at
least as applied to the antebellum judiciary, of the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking.
Jacksonian executives and legislative leaders repeatedly declared that Congress had no power to
incorporate a national bank, enact a general system of internal improvements, or distribute
surplus revenue from land sales to the states. Prospective judicial appointments were carefully
scrutinized to ensure fidelity to these goals. By 1837, a judicial majority was in place on public
record as opposed most elements of the American System. Moreover, that opposition had
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frequently been expressed on constitutional grounds. Any expectation that Jacksonians on the
federal bench might nevertheless disappoint their Jacksonian political sponsors seemed
particularly unrealistic. No Supreme Court in American history was staffed with justices less
likely to separate law and politics. Most Taney Court justices had played active roles in
Jacksonian politics before their judicial appointments and most continued their partisan activities
with varying degrees of discreteness while on the federal bench. That McCulloch was still intact
when Lincoln took office in 1861 seems the most powerful demonstration in American history of
the judicial capacity to cast off previous partisan dispositions and decide cases strictly according
to law.

A. Jacksonian Commitments and Judicial Selection

The Taney Court was a Jacksonian tribunal. Twelve of the sixteen justices who sat on
that bench for at least five years were appointed by Jacksonian executives. The thirteenth was
appointed by John Tyler, a pseudo-Whig whose constitutional views on national power were far
closer to those of Andrew Jackson than Henry Clay.9 Jacksonian executives, at least after
1830,10 carefully scrutinized their judicial nominees to ensure fidelity to Jacksonian
understandings of federal power. President Jackson, Henry Abraham’s classic study of the
judicial appointment process notes, clearly demonstrated “that political loyalty would have
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primacy in his decisions” and “was determined to reward the party faithful.”11 Jackson in 1834
informed Martin van Buren that only jurists whose “principles on the Constitution are sound, and
well fixed” would be considered for Supreme Court nominations.12 Concerned that Marshall
Court justices were “broadly Federal and latitudinarian in all their decisions involving questions
of Constitutional power,” President Polk “resolved to appoint no man who was not an original
Democrat and strict constructionist, and who would be less likely to relapse into the broad
Federal doctrines of Judge Marshall and Judge Story.”13 President Tyler insisted that “no one
should be appointed who was of the school of Story and Kent.”14
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Polk’s concern with justices who were “broadly Federal and latitudinarian in all their
decisions involving questions of Constitution power” highlights two relatively unappreciated
elements of mature Jacksonianism that during the three decades before the Civil War influenced
the judicial selection process and Taney Court decisionmaking. First, Jacksonian executives
were not hostile to judicial power per se. The main problem with justices “broadly Federal and
latitudinarian” was their willingness to sustain controversial exercises of federal power. The
paradigmatic “latitudinous” judicial ruling was McCulloch, the decision sustaining federal power
to incorporate a national bank. Second, Jacksonian executives were more concerned with
limiting Federal power than with advancing a more general state rights agenda. Jacksonians did
advance state rights when insisting that the Constitution entrusted most important governmental
functions to the states. Still, the concern with “broadly Federal and latitudinarian” construction
suggests that expanding the power of states per se was less a central Jacksonian commitment
than limiting federal power. In particular, Jacksonians as a political coalition (as opposed to
particular Jacksonians) do not appear to have been concerned with two state rights issues that did
not involve corresponding limits on federal power: issues concerned federal exclusivity, whether
the mere existence of legitimate federal power automatically barred state regulation even when
the federal government had chosen not to exercise that power, and issues concerning the scope of

Constitution”). Other Jacksonians urged similar judicial nomination strategies. See Swisher,
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such Article I, Section 10 constitutional restrictions on state governmental power as the contracts
clause, restrictions that existed independently of federal power.
The Jacksonian coalition was also not committed to a strict construction, anti-federal
power position on all issues of the day. The Force Bill of 1833, the Mexican War, the
annexation of Texas, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and efforts to acquire Cuba all demonstrate
that Jacksonians in appropriate circumstances would exercise national powers in ways their
political opponents thought unconstitutional. Contrary to the numerous Whigs who had
constitutional scruples about the Mexican War,15 the Democratic Platform of 1848 insisted that
“it is the duty of the country to sustain the administration in every measure necessary to provide
for the vigorous prosecution of the war.”16 Contrary to those Free Soilers and Republicans who
believed that the federal government had no power to return escaped slaves,17 the Democratic
party platforms in 1852 and 1856 asserted that the fugitive slave act of 1850, “being designed to
carry out an express provision of the constitution cannot, with fidelity thereto be repealed nor so
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changed as to destroy or impair its efficiency.”18
Orthodox Jacksonians were nationalists who believed that most ordinary functions of
government were constitutionally entrusted to the states. Few antebellum Democrats accepted
the Calhounian heresy that the federal government was subordinate to the states in all functions.
Jacksonian opposition to nullification in the South and personal liberty laws in the north
demonstrate that its constitutional preference for state action did not extend to state action that
interfered with what Jacksonians believed were legitimate functions of the federal government.
Such Jacksonian judicial nominees as McKinley, Barbour, Wayne and Catron had before joining
the bench distinguished themselves in both the war against the national bank and in defense of
Jackson during the nullification crisis.19 Grier was a strong proponent of the federal power to
assist with the recapture of fugitive slaves.20 This strand of Jacksonian nationalism may help
explain why the two southern Jacksonians appointed to the Supreme Court in the wake of the
nullification crisis, Catron and Wayne, did not resign their seats after 1861 when their home state
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seceded.
The following examination of Jacksonian political commitments and the making of the
Taney Court demonstrates why when measuring the influence of partisanship on judicial
decisionmaking, scholars should not blithely assume that Jacksonians automatically supported
the state rights position,21 that any anti-state vote demonstrates judicial independence and the
separation of law from politics. The extent to which the Taney Court decisions supported or
rejected orthodox Jacksonian policies can be determined only when orthodox Jacksonian policies
are characterized with more sophistication than is often the case in studies of judicial
policymaking. No necessary differences existed between prominent strands of Jacksonian
thought and orthodox Whig positions on such issues as the exclusivity of certain federal powers
and the scope of federal judicial authority. Differences existed on questions of federal power,
but as various partisan responses to the Mexican War demonstrate, those differences are not fully
captured by a model that only considers broad versus narrow constriction of federal power.
Scholars who fail to make these fine distinctions risk labeling Levi Woodbury as “stanchly
Hamiltonian,”22 apparently unaware that before joining the bench Woodbury helped write
Jackson’s message vetoing the national bank and, as Van Buren secretary of the treasury, played
a leading role formulating Jacksonian financial policies.
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1. Judicial Power

Jacksonians in power exhibited no general hostility to judicial power. Democratic party
platforms never took a position or even mentioned those questions of federal jurisdiction that
provoked intense debate during the 1820s. One would not even know from reading Democratic
party platforms that a federal judiciary existed until 1860, when the platform asserted that “the
Democratic party will abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon . . .
questions of Constitutional law” concerning the status of slavery in the territories.23
President Jackson vigorously opposed particular judicial decisions, most notably judicial
decision favoring Cherokee claims, but did not oppose judicial review as a practice. “(A)ll the
rights secured to the citizens under the constitution,” he declared before becoming president, are
“worth nothing, and a mere babble, except as guaranteed to them . . . by an independent and
virtuous Judiciary.”24 The leading study of Jackson’s attitude towards the Supreme Court
concludes that “[t]here is no evidence that the President shared the extreme hostility of many of
his lieutenants” towards the federal judiciary, “and at no time did he cooperate with their
proposals for drastic judicial reform.”25 Even Jackson’s veto of the national bank bill did not
necessarily represent a denial of judicial supremacy. Taney later insisted the veto message
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merely articulated a presidential prerogative to make independent constitutional judgments when
considering whether to sign legislative measures, that Jackson recognized his presidential
obligation to enforce any existing law deemed constitutional by the federal judiciary.26
Jacksonian presidents articulated increased support for the federal judiciary as that branch
of government became dominated by Jacksonian appointees. During the nullification crisis,
Jackson urged South Carolina to litigate whether the protective tariff was constitutional and
successfully fought to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts in the wake of that crisis.27
Pierce; President Buchanan insisted that "the Supreme Court and the Executive branch should
stand shoulder to shoulder . . ., that united they might be able to resist the fanaticism of both the
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North and South."28
When Jacksonian presidents disapproved of specific judicial decisions, they typically
sought to achieve more favorable results by using normal political channels. President Jackson
may have been unwilling to enforce the judicial decision in Worcester v. Georgia, but
Jacksonians in practice settled the case to prevent a clash between the federal executive and
federal judiciary that might have weakened judicial capacity to enforce Jackson’s antinullification policies.29 Jackson and his successors in office ensured that the Supreme Court
would not further interfere with the removal of the Cherokees and other Native American tribes
by subsequently appointing committed proponents of the Jacksonian removal policy to the
federal bench.30 President Van Buren responded to an unwanted judicial decision holding that
the Supreme Court had the power to issue writs of mandamus to cabinet officials31 by asking
Congress to consider repealing the offending statute.32
Jacksonians in the national legislature and states also became increasingly supportive of
federal judicial power as Jacksonians took control of the federal bench. Prominent Jacksonians
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had fought to limit the power of the Supreme Court during the 1820s,33 but by the Jackson
presidency opposition to the court per se was largely limited to the South. An 1831 effort to
repeal Section 25 was defeated in the House of Representatives by almost a 3-1 margin, with
only 6 representatives from free states favoring the bill.34 James Buchanan, a future Jacksonian
president also offered a seat on the court, wrote the committee report that played a vital role
defeating that measure.35 When Roger Taney became Chief Justice and a Jacksonian majority
formed on the Supreme Court, all significant national efforts to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court ceased. Lewis Cass, the Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1848 was
one of many Jacksonians who became a judicial supremacist, proclaiming that "it is a great
moral spectacle to see the decrees of the Judges of our Supreme Court on the most vital
questions obeyed in such a country as this." Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio similarly "look[ed]
to the Supreme Court as the palladium of our institutions and as one of the brightest and purest
ornaments of our system."36 After 1836, the only Jacksonian protests against section 25 came
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from particular states whose laws had recently been declared unconstitutional.37 Attacks on
federal judicial supremacy during the 1850s were generally delivered by Northern Republicans
attempting to protect free state judicial power over alleged fugitive slaves.38 Southern
Jacksonians by that time had become particularly strong supporters of judicial review, passing
legislation facilitating judicial resolution of the status of slavery in the territories.39 Northern
Democrats even defended judicial supremacy in the wake of the Dred Scott decision.40 The
prototype for Reconstruction measures expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts after the Civil
War was first introduced in the Congress by Jacksonians during the 1850s as a means for
obtaining federal jurisdiction over persons accused of obstructing the recapture of fugitive

Caleb Cushing, Attorney General during the Pierce Administration) (“[a]s the supreme appellate
tribunal of the country,” the Supreme Court “possess[es] . . . loyal acquiescence in [its]
judgments”. . . . [O]ur country looks with undoubting confidence” to the Court “as the
interpreters and the guardians of the organic laws of the Union”).
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slaves.41
Jacksonian judicial appointees were generally committed to judicial power. Many Taney
Court justices had maintained before joining the bench that the judiciary was vested with
authority to declare laws unconstitutional before, and others made similar claims while on the
bench. Levi Woodbury while on the New Hampshire state bench in the 1810s endorsed both
judicial review and judicial supremacy when declaring a state law unconstitutional.42 Justice
Wayne as a state legislator vigorously opposed a Georgia resolution denying federal judicial
power to declare laws unconstitutional.43 John Catron declared many state laws unconstitutional
as a state judge, indicated that substantial constitutional limits existed on federal power, and
explicitly affirmed the power of the federal judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional in a letter
written to Andrew Jackson several years before his appointment to the Supreme Bench.44 Taney
regarded judicial decisions as “conclusive” of the case before the Court and may have helped
draft the portion of President Jackson’s “Farewell Address” that asserted a state obligation to
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obey all federal laws until they were repealed or voided by a federal court.45 Both John Connor
Campbell and Philip Barbour as lawyers urged the Supreme Court to declare federal laws
unconstitutional in circumstances which strongly suggest that were advancing personal opinions.
Jacksonian appointees to other legal positions shared this commitment to federal judicial power.
Senator Hayne of South Carolina vigorously complained when President Jackson appointed a
United States attorney who “acknowledge[d] the supremacy of the federal Judiciary over the
Judicial tribunals of the State.”46
Philip Pendleton Barbour was the only Taney Court justice who played a major role in
efforts to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act,47 the section that gave federal courts jurisdiction
to hear appeals from state court decisions (Taney seems to have been opposed to that
endeavor48). Representing Virginia before the Supreme Court, Barbour insisted that the Court
should rule that Congress had no power to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to overturn state
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criminal convictions.49 Still, Barbour’s participation in Cohens v. Virginia and his frequent
demands for limits on federal power highlight an important distinction radical Jacksonians made
when discussing federal judicial authority. Justice Holmes famously declared that while no harm
would come from denying the supreme court the power to declare federal laws unconstitutional,
the Union would fall apart if the justices lacked the power to declare state laws
unconstitutional.50 Jacksonian radicals inverted this proposition. Jacksonian opponents of the
court concentrated their fire of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1787, the provision that enabled
the Supreme Court to declare state laws unconstitutional. The most prominent opponents of
judicial review during the 1820s intended to divest jurisdiction “[i]n all cases where a State shall
be a party, and in all controversies in which a State may desire to become a party in consequence
of having the Constitution or laws of such State questioned” (emphasis added).51 No serious
legislative effort was made to limit federal judicial power over national laws. Indeed, Jacksonian
attacks on the Court frequently condemned that tribunal for not declaring such federal laws as
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the incorporation of the national bank unconstitutional.52 Spencer Roane, for example,
vigorously supported judicial review of federal legislation. He and other old Republicans
objected to McCulloch in part because the Marshall Court evinced too great a willingness to
sustain federal power.53 At the very least, therefore, one cannot deduce from Barbour’s attack in
Cohens on the judicial power to declare state laws unconstitutional that he also opposed the
judicial power to declare federal laws unconstitutional. Opposition to the former may have
entailed support for the latter.
The Jacksonian practice of appointing known proponents of judicial review to the federal
bench suggests that judicial review survived the mid-nineteenth century because politicians
wanted judicial review to survive, and not because the justices managed to separate law from
politics. No shortage existed in 1835 of eligible candidates for the federal bench on record as
opposing judicial review, particularly judicial review of state legislation. Nevertheless, Jackson
and his successors in office when staffing the judiciary consistently passed over such opponents
of broad judicial power as Judge John Bannister Gibson of Pennsylvania54 for politicians and
lawyers who were either committed proponents of judicial power or at least visible conscientious
objectors during the attacks on the judiciary made during the 1820s. Jacksonian efforts to
buttress judicial power through legislation and judicial appointments may be partly explained by
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the general belief that an “independent and virtuous judiciary” would naturally interpret the
constitution correctly. Jacksonians, however, had some fairly specific notions of what correct
decisions an “independent and virtuous judiciary” would naturally reach.

2. State Power

Jacksonian Democrats do not appear as a group to be committed to state rights concerns
that were independent of their commitment to certain limitations on federal power. Virtually
every resolution in the Democratic party platforms adopted from 1840 until 1860 declares a
constitutional or political restraint on federal power. None of these resolutions mention whether
state exercise of that power was constitutional or desirable. Beginning in 1844, Democratic
party platforms did assert that “congress has no power, under the Constitution, to interfere with
or control the domestic institutions of the several States.” The main concern of that resolution,
however, was to oppose any effort “to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery.”
The platform’s assertion that “such States are the sole and proper judges of everything pertaining
to their own affairs” was immediately qualified by the clause “not prohibited by the
Constitution.”55 No mention was made in any platform about the nature of those prohibitions.
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Every antebellum Democratic platform declared that federal powers must be “strictly
construed.”56 None provided any guidelines for interpreting the constitutional limits Article I,
Section 10 placed on state powers.
Jacksonian presidents seemed similarly unconcerned with most issues of state power that
did not involve a corresponding limit on federal power. President Jackson and his successors do
not appear to have taken public positions on the proper scope of the contracts clause, the scope of
most of the other Article I, Section 10 prohibitions on state power or on the power of states to
regulate such matters as interstate commerce, that even Jacksonians agreed the federal
government could constitutionally regulate. When Jacksonian presidents took positions on pure
state rights issues, they did not always favor state power. Jacksonians did enthusiastically
support state efforts to establish jurisdiction of Native American tribes.57 On slavery, however,
Jacksonians took positions that protected state rights in the south by limiting the power of
northern states to pass personal liberty laws and protect abolitionist expression. President
Jackson also attempted to make currencies policies that sharply limited the power of state banks
to issue paper money, but this effort was abandoned.
No consensus on most pure state rights issues existed among Jacksonians at any level of
government. Some Jacksonians in the national government were opposed to a national bank,
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others had more general objections to banks. “I did not join in putting down the Bank of the
United States,” Thomas Hart Benton, a leading Jacksonian senator, declared, “to put up a
wilderness of local banks. I did not join in putting down the paper currency of a national bank,
to put up a national paper currency of a thousand local banks.”58 Jacksonians in state legislatures
were at least as likely as Whigs to favor restricting state power. Jacksonians on state benches
often interpreted state constitutional prohibitions as sharply curtailing the power of the state
legislature. Jacksonian radicals occasionally criticized a Taney Court decision declaring some
state law unconstitutional, but no case inspired a national groundswell suggestive of a broad
Jacksonian consensus that the Supreme Court was wrongly limiting state powers. One reason for
this may be a phenomenon dating back to the Marshall Court days. Judicial decisions declare a
state law unconstitutional were typically supported by interests in neighboring states, regardless
of whether that neighboring state tended to support Whigs or Democrats in national elections.
State laws regulating interstate commerce, for example, tended to be supported by in-state
interests and opposed by out-of-state interests, irrespective of partisan identification.
The relative low salience of and lack of general Jacksonian consensus on issues
concerning the constitutionality of state laws helps explain why Jacksonian judicial nominees
typically had exhibited no uniform tendency to support state interests in cases that did not
involve limiting federal power. Justice Barbour, as noted above, had previously supported
abandoning judicial review of state legislation. Wayne indicated some support for contract and
commerce clause limitations on state power when in the Georgia legislature. Woodbury objected
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to some Marshall Court contracts clause cases but did declare some state laws unconstitutional
when on the New Hampshire bench. Catron was a judicial activist as a state judge; Nelson as a
state judge was more inclined to sustain state power. McKinley objected to Marshall Court
decisions declaring state insolvency laws unconstitutional, but also spoke out against state laws
that interfered with what he believed were federal prerogatives.59 Shortly before his nomination,
Taney wrote a public memorandum which, while anticipating his conclusions in the Charles
River Bridge case, also defended the Supreme Court's conclusion in the Dartmouth College case
that corporate charters were contracts for Article I, Section 10 purposes.60 Taney as counsel for
the state had argued in Brown v. Maryland that although the constitution forbade some state
regulations of interstate commerce, states could tax certain goods that had already entered their
jurisdiction.61 More generally, no Taney Court justice was publicly identified with or clearly
committed to a position on the vast majority of constitutional issues debated by antebellum
jurists that did not directly concern questions of federal power. The only pure issues of state
power that sustained the attention of some Taney Court justices before their nomination were
Indian removal, where state power was vigorously supported by Catron, McKinley, Wayne and
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Taney,62 and hard money, on which both Taney and Catron urged the limitations on state power
necessary "to return to the constitutional currency of gold and silver."63
Jacksonian divisions on some and relative disinterest on other questions concerning the
scope of constitutional limits on state power suggest that Taney Court decisions declaring state
laws unconstitutional do not demonstrate a strong separation between law and politics.
Jacksonian politics hardly dictated Taney Court decisionmaking in cases raising constitutional
limitations on state power. The precise holding in such cases as Knoop and Cooley v. Board of
Wardens64 cannot be deduced from particular Jacksonian understandings of the contracts clause
or of the power of states to regulate certain manifestations of interstate commerce. No
distinctive Jacksonian position on the contracts clause or federal exclusivity existed. The better
understanding of Jacksonian politics explains why Jacksonian politics cannot explain the
decisions in those cases. The low salience of most pure state rights questions in Jacksonian
politics ensured that questions concerning constitutional prohibitions on the states played little
role in the selection of those persons who staffed the Taney Court. Because Jacksonians differed
on these questions, sucessiveful presidential efforts to secure orthodox Jacksonians for the
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federal bench would not, by themselves guarantee that the justices selected would share a
common understanding of constitutional limits on state power. Given the general Jacksonian
commitment to limited federal power, few orthodox Jacksonians were likely to endorse all the
limitations Justice Story would have placed on state governments. Most Jacksonians, the
Jacksonians appointed to the Supreme Court in particular, thought the Marshall Court too
inclined to limit state power. Still, the judicial revolution of 1837 exhausted whatever consensus
may have existed within Jacksonianism on the proper interpretation of the contracts clause, the
commerce clause and other constitutional limits on state power. On those constitutional issues
that arose after 1837, the judicial selection process was likely to yield justices who had
previously articulated different views on no views at all. Explanations of Taney Court
decisionmaking on these matters, therefore, must focus on the attitudes and jurisprudence of
individual Taney Court justices rather than the politics of their Jacksonian sponsors.

C. Federal Power

Jacksonian Democrats were relatively united in their effort to limit certain powers of the
federal government. Many Jacksonians were nationalistic on issues concerning national
expansion, but on matters concerning federal regulation of the economy, antebellum Democrats
almost always advanced narrower conceptions of federal power than their Whig rivals.
Democratic party platforms from 1840 to 1860 contained the identical declaration that “the
federal government is of limited powers, derived solely from the constitution, and the grants of
power shown therein, ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of
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government, and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers.”
That assertion was immediately followed by nearly identical provisos declaring unconstitutional
a national bank, any federal sponsored internal improvements, and various schemes to distribute
to the states the proceeds from the sale of public lands. The protective tariff, while not expressly
declared unconstitutional, was claimed to be inconsistent with “justice and sound policy.”65
Jacksonians in 1852 added a proviso stating that “the democratic party will faithfully abide by
and uphold the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, and in the
report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia legislature in 1799.”66
These platform declarations accurately reflect Jacksonian policymaking at the national
level. Jacksonian executives in their public messages consistently articulated these and other
limitations on federal power in their public messages. FIND. Consistent with these sentiments,
Presidents Jackson, van Buren, Polk, Pierce and Buchanan almost never advocated policies that
seemed unconstitutional according to Jacksonian constitutional understandings. Only on tariff
issues did Democrats in the White House express some ambivalence, supporting reductions but
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refusing to abandon the power to impose protective duties.67 With rare exceptions, Jacksonian
presidents consistently vetoed measures that violated Jacksonian constitutional principles.
Jacksonians were, like other American political coalitions, not completely unified on any
political policy. Commitment to particular coalition goals varied by section, with some
Jacksonians advancing even more extreme limits on federal power and others advocating policies
that seemed unconstitutional by the standards laid down in the party platforms.68 Still, such
Jacksonian congressional leaders as Thomas Hart Benton and Silas Wright were typically found
opposing elements of the American plan. Rarely if ever did proposals for national banking laws,
local internal improvements, distribution or protective tariffs enjoy substantial Democratic
support in Congress. Democrats as a group were praised during the 1850s were "fearlessly
resist[ing] at all hazards a scheme of internal improvements which would ultimately abstract
hundreds of million from the treasury, and consolidate the federal government as the moneyed
head of the nation."69
Jacksonian politicians made self-conscious efforts to secure a federal judiciary committed
to this narrow conception of federal power. Their crucial ideological qualification for
nomination to the Supreme Court was opposition to any latitudinous construction of federal
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power. Jacksonian executives diligently searched to find jurists committed to this goal;
Jacksonians in the Senate killed nominations of persons who might support a national bank and
similar exercises of federal power.70 Much evidence suggests that President Jackson and his
successors could not have not a better job packing the Supreme Court with jurists predisposed to
construe federal power narrowly. From the time Taney took over the reins of the Court until his
death, a clear judicial majority existed on public record as strongly opposed to the national bank
and federal sponsored internal improvements. Moreover, the Jacksonians on the Court were,
almost without exception, militant Jacksonian politicians who did not significantly limit their
partisan activities after joining the bench. No evidence exists that Jacksonians made a strong
separation between law and politics or that Jacksonian jurists thought their judicial positions
required anything more than a certain discreteness when engaging in partisan behavior. Given
the strong support from the presidency the justices could expect from 1836 until1848 and from
1852 until 1860, virtually every model of judicial decisionmaking that does not recognize a
strong separation between law and politics would predict that the Taney Court should have been
the most activist bench in American history, at least on questions of national power.

B. Jacksonian Justices as Jacksonian Politicians

Jacksonian executives sought to break the perceived Federalist stranglehold on the
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judiciary71 by appointing to the Supreme Court veterans of the Bank War with close personal and
partisan connections to other influential Jacksonian leaders. Many Jacksonian judicial nominees
first attracted public notice during the political struggles over the appropriate scope of federal
power contested during the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s. Roger Taney, Levi Woodbury, James
Wayne, Philip Pendleton Barbour, John McKinley, Nathan Clifford, and John Catron played
prominent roles in Jacksonian fights against the national bank and American system. Taney and
Woodbury were trusted members of Jackson’s cabinet (McLean was appointed in part because
on patronage matters he was not a trusted member of Jackson’s cabinet;72 Daniel turned down an
invitation to join the cabinet73), Woodbury was in Van Buren’s cabinet (Daniel again turned
down a position74), and Clifford was attorney general in the Polk administration. Woodbury had
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received serious consideration as possible Jacksonian presidential candidate; Barbour was almost
the Jacksonian nominee for the vice presidency in 1832.75 Woodbury, Wayne, Barbour,
McKinley, and Clifford were Jacksonian leaders in Congress; Nelson was a Jacksonian candidate
for the Senate. Baldwin, Taney, Catron, McKinley, and Daniel played major roles organizing
Jacksonian forces in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama, and Virginia respectively.76
Indeed, every Democrat seriously considered for a Supreme Court seat during the thirty
years before the Civil War, with the exception of Grier and, possibly, Nelson, was a seasoned
political veteran. James Buchanan, who rejected an invitation from Polk (and from Tyler),77 had
previously been a Jacksonian leader in the House of Representatives, a member of President
Polk’s cabinet, and a leading candidate for the presidency, a post he would later obtain. Next to
Jackson and Martin Van Buren (whom Tyler strongly considered appointing to the Supreme
Court),78 Buchanan was probably the most influential Jacksonian politician in antebellum
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America. William Smith, who rejected two invitations from Jackson, served in both the
Alabama and South Carolina state legislatures, represented South Carolina for ten years in the
Senate of the United States, and was responsible for the first state resolution declaring
unconstitutional both protective tariffs and federal sponsored internal improvements.79 Silas
Wright, who rejected a Tyler invitation, was generally considered the second most influential
Jacksonian in New York, next to van Buren. Wright served terms in the New York legislature,
in the House of Representatives, in the Senate, and as Governor of New York.80 Black, whose
nomination by Buchanan was rejected by the Senate, had been the Attorney General in the
Buchanan administration. before being asked to join the Supreme Court. Had Jackson been able
to fill a third vacancy on the Supreme Court before the Bank War, he probably would have
fulfilled his promise to give that appointment to Louis McLane, the Secretary of the Treasury.81
Had McLean been considered a politically more reliable Postmaster General, his Supreme Court
seat would have gone to William Barry, a Kentucky politician whose, instead, became the
Postmaster General. Black was the only one of these Democrats considered for the Supreme
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Court who had any substantial experience as a judge and lawyer. Significantly, Buchanan,
Wright and Smith were all on public record as regarding the national bank and other Whig
measures unconstitutional. Black almost certainly held these views, and Barry supported
Jackson during the Bank War. McLane did not obtain his desired appointment to the Supreme
Court in part because he did not support Jackson during the Bank War
The Jacksonian tendency to prefer seasoned veterans for judicial vacancies provides a
common benefit to Jacksonians and future scholars: known opinions on the vital questions of the
day. Jacksonian executives could have a high degree of confidence that their judicial nominees
were committed Jacksonians, given their past activities and speeches on behalf of the Democratic
party and that party’s commitment to limited federal power over the economy. These public
activities also left a paper trail that enables scholars at the dawn of the twenty-first century to
determine the attitudes of most Jacksonian jurists on those issues that divided Whigs from
Democrats. Hence, an attitudinal model of Taney Court decisionmaking can be constructed that
does not rely on the circular practice of using judicial votes to establish judicial attitudes or,
almost as bad, uses newspaper predictions of judicial votes to establish judicial attitudes. This
biographical approach demonstrates is that both nineteenth century Jacksonians and
contemporary scholars should have expected with a high degree of certainty that Taney Court
would be fierce opponents of the national bank and related American System measures.

B. Taney Court Attitudes on Jacksonian Policies

The judicial majority on the Taney Court was politically predisposed to overrule or at
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least significantly narrow McCulloch v. Maryland.82 Five Taney Court justices, Chief Justice
Roger Taney, Justices Philip Pendleton Barbour, Peter Daniel, Nathan Clifford and Levi
Woodbury had, while in political office, declared that the national bank was unconstitutional.
The other orthodox Jacksonian members of the Taney Court were either leading opponents of the
national back (Justices James Wayne, James Catron, John McKinley, and possibly Samuel
Nelson) or at the very least identified with political factions or political leaders that regarded the
bank as unconstitutional (Robert Grier and John Campbell). Only five justices who sat during
the Taney era, Justices Joseph Story, Smith Thompson, Henry Baldwin, John McLean, and
Benjamin Curtis could be counted on as relative sure votes for sustaining the national bank, and
at no time did these five justices sit together. Taney Court justices who had fought the bank on
constitutional grounds in the national legislature or national executive might nevertheless have
thought the court lacked the power to strike down a law authorizing the national bank. Still, the
most probable swing votes on that question from 1845 to 1860, Justices Wayne and Catron,
were militant opponents of the bank who retained strong Jacksonian political connections. Two
other swing justices, Justices Grier and Nelson, exhibited no such judicial modesty after the Civil
War when declaring that the government had no power to make paper money legal tender for
private debts.83

1. The Jacksonians
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a. Hardliners

Chief Justice Roger Taney, Justice Peter Daniel, Justice Philip Pendleton Barbour, Justice
Levi Woodbury, and Justice Nathan Clifford were the Jacksonian jurists most likely to declare
Whig measures unconstitutional. All before joining the Supreme Court had publicly declared
that the national bank and some other elements of the American System were unconstitutional.
No evidence exists that any of these justices became more Whiggish during their years on the
bench. Barbour was the only justice in this group who had previously expressed qualms about
judicial power, and his attack on the judicial power to declare state laws unconstitutional may
have entailed the judicial power to declare federal laws unconstitutional.
Justice Daniel was an almost certain vote to strike down Whig policies. Daniel, “a major
Jackson-Van Buren lieutenant in Virginia” before joining the federal bench,84 opposed virtually
every proposal in the American System and did so on constitutional grounds. With reference to
an unknown political actor, Daniel in 1840 declared, “(h)e has professed a belief in the
constitutionality of a national bank, and that is an objection which with me would overrule any
and every recommendation which could be urged for him or for any other person."85 Daniel in
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1843 informed Martin Van Buren that “(s)ince a protective tariff necessarily aided selective
industries, it was a discrimination and hence unconstitutional.”86 When President Polk vetoed on
constitutional grounds an internal improvement bill, he received a note on congratulations from
Daniel urging him to stand firm against any future congressional legislation of that ilk.87
Justice Barbour seems almost as certain as Justice Daniel to strike down American plan
measures. Barbour was “as representative a Virginia strict constructionist as can be found.”88 In
Congress much of the time between 1816 and 1831, he was a leading, if not the leading opponent
of broad exercises of national authority.89 Barbour insisted that “the framers of the Constitution
meant to guard as carefully against the latitudinous construction which might be given to
indefinite powers,” and maintained that all federal measures had to have an “immediate, direct,
and obvious relation to the power granted.”90 On the floor of the Congress, he declared internal
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improvements, protective tariffs, a national bankruptcy law and a national bank unconstitutional.
When defending Jackson’s veto of the Maysville road bill, Barbour indicated that his only
quarrel with administration policy was that Jackson too broadly defined national power when
claiming that the federal government could constitutionally build roads in certainly narrowly
defined circumstances. “We are not authorized to construct post roads or military roads,” he
elsewhere declared, “or dig canals, either by any power expressly granted or properly to be
inferred.”91 The Marshall Court, he informed fellow representatives, had “enlarged the sphere of
its actions . . . to an indefinite extent beyond what was in contemplation of those who formed
it.”92
Justices Levi Woodbury and Nathan Clifford were also highly likely to declare American
plan measures unconstitutional. Woodbury was “a strict constructionist of the Constitution” who
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“deplored” McCulloch v. Maryland.93 “A national banking corporation,” he frequently declared,
“is at all times and in all forms, unconstitutional.”94 While “an integral part of Jackson’s
administration,”95 he urged the president to veto the bill rechartering the national bank and
helped write the veto message declaring that institution unconstitutional.96 Woodbury was also a
prominent Jacksonian leader in both houses of Congress, where he consistently condemned both
the national bank and internal improvements on constitutional grounds.97
Clifford was a slightly less prominent clone of Woodbury, who he regarded as one of
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“the great men of our county.”98 Both were New England Jacksonians, had extensive political
careers before joining the bench, and were commited throughout their political life to limiting
national power.99 Clifford first came to national attention as the author of a state resolution
against reincorporating the national bank.100 His legislative speeches consistently endorsed that
position. He was “opposed to a National Bank,” Clifford informed Congress, “believing it to be
both unconstitutional and inexpedient.”101 Clifford also gave speeches in Congress indicating
that internal improvements, protective tariffs and efforts to give to the states proceeds from the
sale of public lands were similarly unconstitutional.102 While a member of Polk’s cabinet, he
helped write presidential veto messages declaring internal improvements unconstitutional.103
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Taney may have been the most orthodox Jacksonian of all. As Daniel Feller notes, he
“stood closer to the ideological heart of Jacksonianism than anyone save Jackson himself.”104
Taney first came to national prominence as the person who helped write Jackson’s veto of the
bank bill, a veto that insisted the bank was neither constitutionally necessary nor constitutionally
proper.105 Significantly, Taney was a leader in the Bank War, and not a mere administration
mouthpiece. He was the first member of the cabinet to insist that the bank was unconstitutional,
wrote a memo to Jackson urging him to veto the bill on numerous constitutional grounds, and
was the only member of the cabinet who consistently supported Jackson’s effort to remove
federal deposits from the national bank.106 “The overthrow of The Monster,” he later wrote,
“was the greatest of all great public services of Genl. Jackson.”107 Taney also opposed on
constitutional grounds other Whig proposals, in particular bills that would distribute surplus
federal revenue to the states. “[T]he revenue which the government is authorized to raise,” he
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informed President Jackson, “was intended to be used for national purposes only, and whenever
it shall exceed what may be useful and constitutionally employed in the exercise of its legitimate
duties it is bound to reduce it.”108 Such assertions suggest Taney believed that both distribution
and protective tariffs were unconstitutional.109
The five Jacksonian hardliners never formed a judicial majority. The terms of Justices
Barbour, Woodbury, and Clifford did not overlap, and the first two were on the Court for a mere
six years. Only from 1845 to 1851, and from 1859 to 1860 did as many as three justices who can
clearly be identified on record as regarding most Whig proposals unconstitutional sit on the
bench. If Whig measures were to be condemned, the Taney Court hardliners would have to gain
the votes of other Jacksonian appointees, appointees whose position on the constitutionality of
American plan proposals was less clear.

b. Swings?
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Justices John McKinley, John Catron, James Wayne, Samuel Nelson, Robert Grier, and
John Campbell were the probable swing votes during the Taney years on issues concerning
constitutional status of various American System measures. Had these justices voted as a bloc, a
high probability exists that the result they favored would have commanded a judicial majority on
the Taney Court. It is hard to image circumstances where these justices voted to sustain a Whig
program, but the Jacksonian hardliners gained the votes from at least two of the Whigs on the
Court necessary to declare the measure unconstitutional. Similarly, if these justices voted as a
bloc to strike down a measure, they were highly likely to pick up the one or two votes necessary
from a Jacksonian hardliner (Daniel in particular) to form the majority necessary to declare the
measure unconstitutional.
Significantly, with the exception of Justice McKinley, the other five justices are
considered swing votes primarily because of a relative lack of easily accessible information on
their constitutional attitudes towards the national bank, internal improvements, and similar
measures. All were life-long Democrats. With the exception of Nelson, who was appointed by
the psuedo-Whig, Tyler, all were appointed by Democratic presidents who repeatedly vetoed
Whig measures on constitutional grounds and insisted that they only appointed to the Supreme
Court jurists who would narrowly construe federal powers. Still, in part because with the
exception of Wayne and McKinley, the Jacksonian swings did not serve in Congress, the existing
evidence does not permit the same degree of confidence that Justices Grier, Nelson, Campbell,
Wayne, Catron had the same constitutional objections to the American System as did Chief
Justice Taney, and Justices Daniel, Barbour, Woodbury, and Clifford.
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Virtually no primary or secondary evidence exists on the political attitudes of Robert
Grier on those issues that divided Jacksonians from Whigs. Grier was a “life long Democrat,”
who owed his appointments to the state and federal bench to his partisan affiliations.110 The
Governor of Pennsylvania, when recommending Grier to President Polk, claimed that Grier was
“a sincere and steadfast advocate” of “[t]he rights guaranteed by the constitution to the states–the
republican doctrine of state rights–opposition to a national bank–all the cardinal principles of the
democratic party.”111 Alas, no easily accessible public statement made by Grier has survived
that specifically expresses his attitudes on the expedience or constitutionality of any element of
the American plan.
Evidence on Justice Samuel Nelson’s political attitudes is almost as sparse, other than
that he was more involved than Grier in both local and national Democratic party politics.
Nelson was closely associated with the Van Buren wing of New York Democrats, was their
nominee for the Senate in 1844, and was apparently considered for the Democratic presidential
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nomination in 1860.112 Edward Countryman asserts that Nelson while on the bench maintained
“a deep interest in public affairs and entertained decided opinions upon all questions of National
policy,” but does not reveal what those opinions were.113 As was the case with Grier, one might
suspect he shared Jacksonian hostility to national banks and internal improvements. This
inference is somewhat stronger for Nelson, given the near impossibility of anyone being the New
York Democratic nominee for the Senate in 1844 who was not known to regard most Whig
proposals as unconstitutional.
More information exists on Justice Campbell, but existing evidence presents a somewhat
conflicting position on his attitude towards the national bank, internal improvements and other
Whig measures. During the 1830s, Campbell publicly identified with the Jacksonian coalition in
Alabama that supported Jackson’s Maysville veto and his veto of the bill rechartering the
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national bank.114 On the other hand, Campbell’s most recent biographer maintains that during
this time period, the future justice privately maintained an “all-but-Whig ideology.”115 While
publicly supporting the Jacksonian candidate for Senate in 1836, Campbell privately declared he
“infinitely preferred the alternative,” a candidate on record as supporting “the constitutionality of
tariff laws, of internal improvements, and [of] the incorporation of a national bank.” Campbell
quickly added, however, that his preferred candidate, Judge Hopkins “disclaims all idea of aiding
in any & abhors the policy of each.” Moreover, his criticisms of the rival candidate, future
Justice John McKinley, were entirely on personal grounds.116 Thus, a fair inference exists that
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Campbell supported Hopkins despite rather than because of that candidate’s constitutional
positions. More significantly, Campbell by 1850 had “reassessed what he perceived as the
fundamental meaning of the constitution” and had developed an “increasingly inflexible states’
rights philosophy.”117 The New York Tribune when Campbell was nominated declared him
“about the ablest man connection with the ultra State-Rights organization, . . . filled with all the
dogmas and mad metaphysics of Mr. Calhoun.”118 Still, Campbell’s precise opinions on federal
power in matters unrelating to slavery cannot be identified with any degree of certainty at the
time of his nomination to the federal bench. Campbell’s nomination was strongly supported by
state’s rights advocates, but whether that support transcended slavery issues is unclear. Campbell
in 1860 privately noted that southerners objected to the national bank, but did not indicate
whether he shared that aversion.119
Justice Wayne’s political opinions are far easier to discern. As a Jacksonian
representative from Georgia during the 1820s, Wayne led the fight against Whig efforts to
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recharter the national bank. One influential Jacksonian listed Wayne as “among the ten zealous,
able, determined” members of the House who support Jackson administration banking policy.120
Wayne also specifically praised Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road Bill and condemned the
protective tariff as unconstitutional.121 His biographer concludes that “Wayne had no trouble in
subscribing to his party’s platform, which was distinctly Jacksonian in tone. It opposed the Bank
of the United States, the principle of the protective tariff, and Internal Improvements by the
general government.”122 Wayne is classified as a Jacksonian swing only because, although he
indicated that he regarded protective tariffs and federal sponsored internal improvements
unconstitutional, no record exists of Wayne explicitly declaring the national bank
unconstitutional (or constitutional). Still, Wayne interpreted federal powers quite narrowly. His
speeches called for “a limitation of the action of the Government to the text of the constitution”
and rejected “the employment of all means, which are not essential to the execution of a
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substantially granted power.”123 Wayne in 1854 declared he gave national powers “a rational
and limited interpretation” as opposed to those “whose tendency has been to give [the national
government] legislative ability in cases where the power has not been delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, or when power have been asserted by the Legislation of the United
States, which were reserved to the States respectively or the people.”124
That Justice Wayne was at least a Jacksonian swing and probably a Jacksonian hardliner
may seem mistaken in light of voting analyses which seem to confirm Justice Curtis’s initial
impression that Wayne and McLean were the two “most high-toned Federalists on the bench.”125
Wayne did exhibit a strong nationalist strain on the bench, particularly on issues of federal
jurisdiction and the exclusivity of the federal commerce power.126 These votes, however, hardly
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suggest Jacksonian apostasy. Jacksonians, as noted above, increasingly supported expanding the
jurisdiction of federal courts and never reached a consensus on whether the federal commerce
power was exclusive. Moreover, Wayne had exhibited the same mixture of localist and
nationalist sentiments while in Congress. At the same time he was battling against the national
bank and internal improvements, Wayne supported all military appropriations and was the only
representative from Georgia who voted for the Jackson Force Bill, with its dramatic increase in
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.127 Significantly, Wayne’s commitment to exclusive federal
power did not entail any commitment to broad federal power. He strongly supported Justice
Story’s nationalistic assertion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that only the federal government could
pass laws concerning fugitive slaves,128 but was also the justice most responsible for placing the
court on record in Dred Scott as holding that the federal government had no power to prohibit
slavery in the territories.129 That Wayne considered the federal commerce power to be exclusive,
therefore, does not provide sufficient clues to how broad he thought that power was.
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Significantly, perhaps, his biographer thought that Wayne would have declared internal
improvements unconstitutional had the issue arose.130 Justice Curtis may have associated Wayne
and McLean, but Justice McLean during the early 1840s complained that Wayne, Catron, Daniel
and Thomson had formed a judicial alliance against the proto-Whigs on the Court.131
Justice Catron was also a prominent Jacksonian political actor, a “longtime personal and
political friend” of President Jackson, and a self-described “enem[y] of the U.S. Bank.”132
During the bank wars, Catron organized support for Jackson administration policy, and wrote
several articles condemning that institution.133 Just before being appointed to the federal bench,
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Catron urged Jackson not to be distracted from the “battle against thirty-five millions of money
[the Bank of the United States], against uncompromising nullification, against a scheme of
protection, and of its correlative, waste by internal improvements.”134 Catron retained these
Jacksonian connections while on the federal bench. He corresponded regularly with Presidents
Jackson, Polk and Buchanan, ran the Van Buren presidential campaign in Tennessee and was one
of Polk’s main campaign advisors.135 He is classified as a Jacksonian swing only because, as
was the case with Wayne, no easily accessible public record exists of whether he thought the
hated bank was unconstitutional (or constitutional).
Justices McKinley also straddles the border between a Jacksonian swing and hardliner.
He began his career as a National Republican, but joined Jacksonian forces by 1826, though
some contemporaries questioned whether his conversion was sincere.136 McKinley actively
participated in the fight against the national bank in Congress, where he strongly supported the
Jackson administration’s effort to remove government deposits from Biddle’s institution, and the
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Alabama legislature, where he wrote a petition declaring that bank “inconsistent with our free
institutions, and dangerous to the peace and safety of the union.”137 He condemned Marshall
Court decisions by which “the powers of the Federal Government are, by mere construction,
made to overshadow State powers, and render them almost contemptible,” and insisted that the
national goernment exercise only those powers “expressly granted by the Constitution.”138
McKinley occasionally spoke out against internal improvements, once describing the system as
“unjust and partial,”139 and insisted that “the United States cannot hold land in any State of the
Union, except for the purposes enumerated in the Constitution.”140 Nevertheless, he also
supported the Maysville Road Bill and vigorously urged the federal government to give the
proceeds of the sale of public lands to the states.141 Still, at the time of his appointment to the
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federal bench, he seems to have been considered an “orthodox, administration Democrat,”142 an
acknowledged leader of the Jacksonian forces in Alabama, and a close associate of James K.
Polk, the leader of Jacksonian forces in Congress.143 John Connor Campbell, at least, was under
the impression that McKinley campaigned for the Senate in 1836, the year before his
appointment, on a platform of constitutional opposition to the national bank, protective tariffs,
and internal improvements.144
This survey of the Jacksonian swings provides much support for Webster’s fear that
McCulloch was in imminent danger of being overruled. Grier, Nelson, Wayne, and Catron were
not classified as hardliners only because in 1999 no easily accessible public record exists of their
declaring the national bank unconstitutional. The evidence that does exist, however, suggests
that their contemporaries would have classified them with Clifford and Woodbury with respect
to attitudes towards the American System. McKinley is best classified as a Jacksonian hardliner
on the national bank, a swing on internal improvements, and a Whig on distribution. Campbell

Hicks, “McKinley,” p. 229; Gatell, “McKinley,” p. 772. McKinley did insist, however, that he
supported the Maysville bill only because he was under instructions to do so from the Alabama
state legislature. Martin, “McKinley,” pp. 17-18, 21.
142

Gatell, “McKinley, p. 773. Jackson was apparently convinced that McKinley was sincere.

See Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 104.
143

Martin, “McKinley,” p. 30; Sellers, Polk: Jacksonian, p. 213.

144

See Saunders, Campbell, p. 31.

55
is the only Jacksonian on whom the evidence of personal attitudes is conflicting. The evidence is
clear, however, that he was becoming increasing opposed to most exercises of federal power at
the time he was appointed to the Supreme Court.

2. The Whigs

The Taney Court could not be expected to adopt unanimously an anti-federal power
position on the national bank and internal improvements for reasons that were both external and
internal to the Jacksonian coalition. Jacksonian executives did not appoint all the justices who sat
on the Supreme Court from 1836 until 1861. Justices Story and Thompson were appointed by
National Republican executives. Justice Curtis was appointed by a Whig. The Taney Court after
1861 could be expected to demonstrate increased nationalist proclivities both as a consequence of
three Lincoln judicial appointees and the very real fear that the Lincoln administration would
ignore judicial decisions unduly limiting national power. Substitute Jeremiah Black for Noah
Swayne,145 imagine a Congress willing to defend judicial power, and the Supreme Court during
the Civil War probably would have declared unconstitutional Lincoln’s imposition of the
blockade that was, in fact, sustained by one vote in the Prize Cases.146
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Whig strength on the Supreme Court was augmented by the extreme fluidity of American
partisan coalitions during the first years of the second party system. Jackson’s first two judicial
appointees, Justices McLean and Baldwin, were appointed before political events led Jackson to
define for himself and the nation the narrow construction of national power that would unite most
Democrats during the late 1830s, 1840s and 1850s.147 As Daniel Feller and other historians note,
Jackson’s “plans and policies were a mystery” when he first took office.148 Before Jackson’s veto
of the Maysville Road bill and national bank, many politicians, particularly in the Northwest,
campaigning for Jackson as a friend of internal improvements. Prominent western Jacksonians in
1828 claimed to be better friends of internal improvements than Western supporters of John
Quincy Adams. McLean and Baldwin were, thus, well within the Jacksonian mainstream when
appointed to the Supreme Court. That they were no longer Jacksonians by 1836 was less a
consequence of any change of position on their part, but the result of a greater clarification of the
Jackson coalition as many (not all) proponents of the bank and internal improvements either
adjusted their policy commitments or joined the Whig opposition.149 Only after the bank wars did
Jackson highlight commitment to limiting national power when making judicial appointments.150
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So understood, the McLean and Baldwin appointments highlight how alleged judicial
mistakes often reflect the changed concerns of a political coalition, not marked differences in
what was originally expected of a judicial appointee. Jacksonians later complained that Jackson
bungled his first two appointments,151 but the better explanation, given the known proclivities of
his nominees, was that Jackson had not yet firmly committed himself on constitutional issues
before the bank War and Maysville Road veto. Justices McLean and Baldwin were known
commodities in 1828. Baldwin, in particular, was recognized as a committed proponent of tariffs
and internal improvements. Every politically active Jacksonian knew this. Baldwin’s views
remained the same when on the bench; the nature of the Jacksonian coalition changed.
The Baldwin and McLean nominations also highlight a point made earlier with respect to
Taney Court decisionmaking in state cases, that politics may often better explain the parameters
of judicial decisionmaking the dictate the precise content of particular judicial decisions. The
nature of the Jacksonian coalition in 1828 did not practically guarantee the selection of justices
with relatively broad understandings of federal power. Before nominating Baldwin, President
Jackson was turned down by Senator William Smith of South Carolina, a vigorous opponent of
the American System.152 Rather, the examination of politics explains Jacksonian appointees
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before 1832 (and Tyler appointees nominated when Tyler was mending fences with Whigs) could
be sympathetic to federal power. Jackson during his first years in office considered appointing
both known proponents and known opponents of federal power to regulate economic life because
administration policy was not yet firmly settled on those matters. Political needs change over
time, sometimes creating openings for certain kinds of justices, at other times practically
foreclosing judicial options. Before 1830, attitudes on federal power varied more by region than
by party. Westerners generally favored internal improvements and tariffs; southerners were
generally opposed to both. After 1830, a political system began to form which increasingly
privileged opponents of federal power for all judicial vacancies when Jacksonians were in office.
One consequence of Jackson’s early travails and occasional Whig political successes was
that five justices who sat on the Taney Court before the Civil War could be considered certain or
almost certain votes to sustain most elements of the American plan, Joseph Story, Henry Baldwin,
Smith Thompson, John McLean, and Benjamin Curtis. Joseph Story is the easiest vote to
ascertain. He was a part of the unanimous court that upheld the national bank in McCulloch and
then sent a note to President Monroe indicating that the court’s opinion in the bank case
absolutely committed them to sustaining federal power to make internal improvements. While
purporting to be above partisan politics, Story admitted to generally voting a straight Whig ticket,
frequently drafted nationalistic legislation for Whigs to introduce in Congress, and regarded the
principles underlying McCulloch as of “fundamental importance to the existence of the
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government.”153 At the end of the War of 1812, called on National Republicans to “ extend the
national authority over the whole extent of power given by the Constitution.” “Let us,” he
declared,
have great military and naval schools; an adequate regular army; the broad
foundations laid of a permanent navy; a national bank; a national system of
bankruptcy; a great navigation act; a general survey of our ports, and appointments
of port-wardens and pilots; Judicial Courts which shall embrace the whole
constitutional powers; national notaries; public and national justices of the peace,
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for the commercial and national concerns of the United States.154
Whether Joseph Story would have shared Justice Robert Jackson’s interpretation of McCulloch as
sanctioned virtually any exercise is open to question. As Howard Gillman points out, Story and
other antebellum jurists sympathetic to American System measures, neverthleless believed that
most areas of economic life were reserved to the states. Nineteenth century Whigs should not be
confused with New Dealers. Moreover, Story on circuit helped develop the equal footing
doctrine, which, as will be discussed below, limited federal power over public lands in states.
Still, on all questions of federal power in which Whigs differed from Jacksonians, Story could be
found defending the exercise of federal power.
Justices Henry Baldwin, John McLean, and Benjamin Curtis could be counted on to
support federal power to almost the same degree of certainty as Justice Story. Baldwin was a
leading proponent of internal improvements and protective tariffs when in Congress.155 He
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publicly opposed Jackson’s attempt to destroy the national bank, urged Taney to curtail the
administration’s attack on that institution, and joined the Whig opposition once it formed.156
Story, a reliable authority on Whig orthodoxy, thought “quite well of the [Baldwin]
appointment.”157
McLean in politics is best described as a “Madisonian Whig.”158 McLean claimed “he had
never voted an anti-Whig ticket,” and that “(n)o person in the United States desires more ardently
than I do, the ascendancy of Whig principles generally.”159 As a congressperson during the
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1810s, he was a devotee of internal improvements and protective tariffs, as well as an opponent of
John Randolph. An admiring biographer declared that McLean “has always sustained the great
Whig cause and measures–has supported a Revenue Tariff, shaped for the protection of Home
Industry; a well regulated system of Currency; and uniformly opposed the Sub-treasury,” the
banking system favored by many Jacksonian Democrats.160 McLean did vote against the national
bank in 1817, but by the 1840s made clear that he thought the constitutionality of that bank had
been settled by McCulloch.161 Story regarded McLean as “a good and satisfactory appointment,”
maintained “an intimate friendship” with him while they were on the bench, and was “warmly
interested that [McLean] should become a candidate for the Presidency.”162 Given McLean’s
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constant hunger for the presidency, one cannot rule out the possibility that he might have cast a
vote against some aspect of the American plan under the right political conditions.163 Still, while
McLean’s past politics cannot rule out the possibility that he would have voted to declare specific
details of the American plan unconstitutional, little doubt exists that his vote in most cases would
have followed Justice Story.
Benjamin Curtis identified with conservative Whigs throughout his political career and
“always voted for the candidate of the Whig party while that organization continued to exist.”164
Though specific records of his attitude towards the national bank do not seem to have survived,165
Curtis was a strong supporter of Daniel Webster, whom he praised for “the just and sound
principles which you have always held and enforced “ on “the maintenance of a safe currency”(a
probable reference to Webster’s support of the national bank), and for being “a steady and
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powerful friend” of “the internal improvements of the whole United States.”166 Curtis did
strongly oppose the policies Lincoln adopted to fight the Civil War, most notably the
emancipation proclamation and the suspension of habeas corpus. Before joining the bench, he
asserted that “(t)he question whether the Constitution of the United States gives the power to
construct roads is an open and difficult one.”167 Nevertheless, nothing in his antebellum record
supports an inference that he would have declared Whig policies unconstitutional, and much
indicates that he would have happily sustained such measures.
Justice Smith Thompson’s attitudes on the issues dividing Whigs from Jacksonians are
more difficult to ascertain. Thompson’s initial political associations were with leading New York
anti-federalists and he formed a political alliance with Martin van Buren early in both of their
careers. He was also a protégée of the conservative jurist James Kent, strongly identified with the
more moderate wing of New York Republicanism during the 1810s, and a strong supporter of
Adams against Jackson during the 1828 presidential election.168 Thompson’s opinions on the
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New York bench indicate strong support for state incorporated banks,169 but the issue that divided
Jacksonians from Whigs was the desirability of a national bank, not banking per se.
Unfortunately, as Thompson’s biographer acknowledges, on questions concerning “Hamiltonian
programs,” “Thompson’s views . . . were not specifically recorded.”170 Thompson concurred in a
judicial decision condemning state power to interfere with the national bank his first year on the
federal bench, but he had suggested a more narrow conception of federal power while on the New
York bench. He later reaffirmed that narrow conception of federal power in his dissenting
opinion in Brown v. Maryland.171 Perhaps the best that can be said of this sparse record is that
Thompson probably would have sustained McCulloch, given his penchant for stare decisis,172 but
might have joined a judicial majority declaring some forms of internal improvement
unconstitutional. Donald Roper accurately sums up the available evidence when he declares
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“(w)hat Thompson would have done had he been faced with positive Congressional legislation is
so far removed from the actual facts that it is hardly worth conjecture. For what it is worth,
however, he probably would have upheld such laws.”173 At least John Quincy Adams though
Thompson a friend of the national bank.174
The Whigs on the Taney Court did not always favor national power on those issues that
divided antebellum Jacksonians and their opponents. On some issues, judicial Whigs maintained
that Jacksonians in power were acting unconstitutionality. Story complained of numerous
constitutional violations during the Jackson presidency, most notably the way government
deposits were removed from the national bank.175 He also wrote several pamphlets attacking
Jacksonian claims that the federal government was constitutionally authorized to annex Texas.176
McLean publicly declared the Mexican war unconstitutional.177
Still, at no point after 1837 was there a Whig/proto-Whig majority on the Court that could
be counted on to defend the bank and perhaps void some Jacksonian measure, even if Thompson
is considered a Whig on all matters. Thompson died in 1843, Baldwin the next year, and Story
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the next year. Curtis was only on the bench from 1851 until 1857. Hence, during the twenty
years before the Civil War, the Court would need at least one and on average three Jacksonian
defectors in order for a judicial majority to sustain any element of the American plan. Virtually,
all of the eleven possible defectors, however, were on record politically as opposing most
elements of the American System. Many had explicitly declared such measures unconstitutional.

4. The Attitudinal Scorecard and Judicial Decisionmaking

If the justices are lined up in very rough order according to their attitudes on the national
bank and internal improvements for the purpose of determining which justice would most likely
have been in the judicial majority in a case raising the constitutionality of these American System
proposals,178 the results are as follows. On the national bank, Catron would have been the most
probable swing justice from 1837 until 1845, Wayne would have been the swing justice from
1846 until 1851, Grier (or Nelson) would have been the swing justice from 1852 until 1858, and
Catron would have been the swing justice from 1859 until 1860. On distribution and any other
matter McKinley thought constitutional, Thompson would have been the swing justice from 1837
until 1843, McLean (or another of the Whigs) would have been the swing justice in 1844 and
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1845, Catron would have been the swing justice from 1846 until 1851, Grier (or Nelson) would
have been the swing justice from 1852 until 1858, and Catron would have been the swing justice
from 1859 until 1860. In short, the national bank throughout the Taney years and internal
improvements after 1844 would have survived judicial scrutiny only if such measures were held
constitutional by justices who were strong partisans of the party vigorously opposed to that
measure and often by a justice who before joining the bench had led the political fight against
such measures. The Supreme Court during the 1840s would have declared the national bank
unconstitutional even if three partisan Jacksonians defected and voted to sustain that measure.179
Contemporary approaches to judicial decisionmaking offer three reasons that might
explain why, despite the attitudes reflected in this scorecard, the Taney Court failed to narrow or
overrule McCulloch. Proponents of the strategic model of judicial decisionmaking may suspect
that crucial Jacksonians on the bench did not vote their policy preferences in some cases in order
to avoid political reprisals. The Warren Court retreat during the late 1950s is generally credited to
that tribunal’s desire to prevent the passage in Congress of proposals to curtail federal jurisdiction
over numerous subjects.180 Perhaps Taney and others feared that a decision overruling
McCulloch would inspire a legislative crusade against judicial review. Proponents of the
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attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking may suspect that crucial Jacksonian appointees
changed their mind on the expedience, justice or constitutionality of some contested policy.
Justice William Brennan clearly became more sympathetic to women’s rights issues when on the
Court.181 Perhaps Taney and others when on the bench abandoned their objections to the monster
bank. Proponents of the legal model of judicial decisionmaking may suspect that the judicial role
compelled Jacksonians on the bench to abandon partisan behaviors and articulate different
sentiments then they previously uttered when engaged in legislative and electoral politics. Justice
Felix Frankfurter insisted that justices were often obligated to sustain measures they would
condemned as legislators.182 Perhaps Taney and others concluded that such legal considerations
as precedent and deference to other institutions compelled them to be conscientious
nonparticipants in the Bank War they helped initiated while in the elective branches of the
government.
The strategic model of judicial decisionmaking clearly does not explain Taney Court
decisionmaking from 1836 to 1860. The model does perform wonderfully during the Civil War.
The desperate desire to avoid a clash with the Lincoln administration best explains the gross
misreading of the Judicial Act of 1787 the Taney Court majority proffered in Roosevelt v.
Meyer183to justify the decision to deny the jurisdiction necessary to decide the constitutionality of
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the Legal Tender Act of 1862.184 During the twenty-five years before the Civil War, however, the
federal government was either partly or fully dominated by officials who desired a judicial
decision limiting or overruling McCulloch. No evidence exists that any prominent Jacksonian or
Whig would challenge judicial rulings substantially narrowing the scope of federal power over the
national economy. When the Supreme Court in Dred Scott declared a federal law
unconstitutional, that decision was strongly supported by the Buchanan administration.
The partisan behavior of most Taney Court justices while on the bench refutes the
attitidunal suggestion that crucial Jacksonian justices became more sympathetic to Whig
programs when on the bench and casts grave doubts on the legal hypothesis that the judicial role
substantially constrained Taney Court behavior. Taney Court justices retained both their political
commitments and partisan connections throughout their tenure on the bench. Few, if any,
believed that their position on the court barred various efforts to give non-legal aid and comfort to
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their political sponsors, as long as such aid and comfort was given somewhat discretely.
Supreme Court justices during the Taney years routinely engaged in the sort of partisan
activism that contemporary jurists officially shun. Catron was particularly active in political
affairs while on the Court. He helped manage Polk’s successful presidential campaign in 1844,
and served as a trusted political advisor to Presidents Jackson, Polk and Buchanan.185 Chief
Justice Taney corresponded regularly with Jacksonian presidents and consulted with President
Van Buren on financial policy.186 Taney, Grier and Clifford while on the bench informed
President Buchanan, his subordinates or political allies that crucial administration policies had
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their full support.187 After Polk was elected, Taney wrote him a letter declaring,
I feel so truly rejoiced at your election as President of the U. States, that I must
indulge myself in the please of offering you my cordial congratulations. We have
passed through no contest for the Presidency more important than the one just
over; nor have I seen any one before in which so many dangerous influences were
combined as were united in support of Mr. Clay. Your triumphant success gives
me increased confidence in the intelligence firmness & virtue of the American
people; and in the safety and stability of the principles upon which our institutions
are founded.188
Peter Daniel while on the bench continued to advise Democratic leaders and conservative
Virginia politicians. He publicly supported Martin van Buren’s presidential efforts in 1844.189
Joseph Story drafted Whig campaign documents and prominent legislation, including the
prototype for the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Grier vigorously supported the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850, publicly attacking opponents of that measure.190 John McLean used his judicial post as a
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springboard in his incessant campaigns for the presidency. Samuel Nelson and John Campbell
were seriously considered for the Democratic party’s 1860 presidential nomination;191 Levi
Woodbury also seems to have had presidential aspirations while on the Court.192 Campbell and
Nelson played leading roles in efforts to bring about a compromise that would have prevented
secession and the Civil War.193 Nelson personally met with prominent members of Lincoln’s
cabinet to inform them that both he and Chief Justice Taney believed the president could not use
force to coerce a state that had seceded from the Union.194 The Jay Court may have officially
sworn off advisory opinions,195 but that precedent did not inhibit Justices Story, Daniel and
Baldwin from responding to a Senate request for an analysis of federal bankruptcy law (Taney,
Thompson and McLean largely refrained from passing judgment) or Justice Story from
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submitting to the full court his proposals for expanding federal admiralty jurisdiction.196
These partisan activities seemingly deal a devastating blow to attitudinal models of
judicial decisonmaking, at least as those models are applied to the Taney Court. Every political
element required by scholars who think legal factors have almost no influence on judicial outputs
is firmly in place. Jacksonian presidents had a common set of policies in mind when selected
Supreme Court justices. All the evidence indicates that these presidents selected justices who
were devoted to Jacksonian political causes. Indeed, the justices continued to play leadership
roles in these causes while on the bench. All that is missing is what Jacksonian presidents and
contemporary attitudinalists expect, a series of judicial decisions sharply limited the constitutional
power of the federal government to regulate the economy.
This attitudinal debacle is an apparent cause for legalist celebration. A political regime
makes a strenuous attempt to pack the judiciary with partisans committed to that regime’s policy
preferences. The justices in their off-the-bench activities demonstrate the most limited
commitment to the separation of law and politics. Those very justices, however, seeming make a
sharp separation between the two when deciding cases. A judiciary on public record as regarding
a national bank, federal sponsored internal improvements and various distribution schemes as
gross usurpations of power nevertheless refuses to tinker with McCulloch or any other precedent
sanctioning such exercises of federal power. One can almost hear the cry “Hallelujah” echoed
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from the law schools (and a few political science departments).197

C. Law and Jacksonian Politics

If Supreme Court justices during the Taney years seemingly demonstrated a remarkable
independence from their Jacksonian sponsors, the credit belongs primarily with the justices and
not with antebellum politicians. Jacksonian politicians did not recognize law as an enterprise
entirely distinct from politics. Political coalitions during the years before the Civil War
consistently sought to pack the court with jurists sympathetic to their party’s platform. No lawyer
was deemed deserving of a seat on the federal bench solely by virtue of stellar legal
qualifications. Rather, Jacksonians regarded past loyalty to Jacksonian political causes as the
main virtue in a prospective judicial nominee. Indeed, Jacksonians in several respects made less
of a separation between law and politics than political actors did after the Civil War.
One manifestation of the separation between law and politics is the general sense that the
qualifications for political offices are different than the qualifications for judicial offices. A
regime that respected this difference between law and politics would normally appoint to the
Supreme Court persons whose previous career was primarily spent in law. The vast majority of
justices appointed after the Civil War, in fact, had previously distinguished themselves primarily
as law professors, lawyers or judges. President Truman and, to a lesser extent, President Franklin
Roosevelt are the only executives over the last one-hundred and forty years who tended to

197

See Kahn

76
nominate to the Supreme Court persons with more experience in politics than law.
No general consensus existed before the Civil War that federal justices ought to have
different backgrounds than politicians. While partisans from one party occasionally attacked an
appointee from another party as a political hack, such objections went more to the nominee’s
perceived constitutional politics than to partisan affiliation per se. Most Jacksonian appointees
spent virtually all of their pre-judicial careers in electoral politics. McLean, Baldwin, Wayne,
Taney, Clifford, McKinley, Woodbury, Barbour, Catron and Daniel had all earned national
reputations in legislative and partisan politics before joining the federal bench. Grier and Nelson
were the only two Taney Court justices who were best known as judges before their Supreme
Court appointment. Nelson, just before joining the federal bench, had been the Democratic
candidate for the Senate in New York. Curtis and Campbell were the only two Taney Court
justices who were best known as lawyers before joining the Supreme Court. Campbell, just
before joining the bench, had become a leading political spokesperson for southern rights. Many
Taney Court justices are still known as much for their partisan political activities before and after
their judicial service as for that judicial service. No member of the present Supreme Court may
merit a biography for their non-judicial activities,198 but most biographies written of Taney Court
justices spend as much time detailing their political activities as their legal activities.
If anything, judicial nominees without substantial political experience fared less well in
the antebellum confirmation process. The judicial nominees the Senate rejected tended to have
far more traditional legal backgrounds than either the nominees confirmed or the persons who
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refused to be nominated. George W. Woodward, the only Jacksonian judicial nominee rejected
by the full Senate, was one of only two Jacksonian judicial nominees with virtually no experience
in electoral politics (the other was Grier). Of the eight other judicial nominees the Senate refused
to confirm, only three had prominent political careers, Senator George Badger, Attorney General
Jeremiah Black, and John Spencer. Black probably would have been confirmed had his
nomination been sent to the Senate before the election of 1860 or even before many southern
senators had resigned their seats.199 Three of the other rejected nominees were career judges,
Reuben Walworth, Edward King, and John Meredith Read. The other two were career lawyers,
William Micou and Edward Bradford.200 Every Jacksonian Democrat who turned down a
presidential judicial nomination has a fairly substantial entry in the Dictionary of American
Biography. Of the justices appointed, only Grier and possibly Nelson would have lacked an entry
had they not been on the Supreme Court. Four of the nine rejected justices (King, Micou,
Bradford and Woodward) have no biography. The Read and Walworth entries are substantially
shorter than the biographies of the persons who rejected judicial nominations.
Whigs and orthodox Jacksonians had different notions of proper judicial qualifications.
With the exception of Polk, Jacksonians always promoted seasoned politicians to the Supreme
Court. Fillmore, the one orthodox Whig president who had the opportunity to make judicial
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appointments, consistently choose persons from more traditional legal backgrounds.201 Lincoln
also preferred professional lawyers and judges for filling associate judicial vacancies, though
David Davis served as his political manager.202 Tyler’s nomination patterns are particularly
interesting. Three of the four Democrats he strongly considered nominating to the Supreme
Court, Buchanan, Wright, Van Buren, were career politicians. Nelson was the exception. By
comparison, four of the six Whigs Tyler asked to join the Supreme Court, Horace Binney,
Walworth, King, and Read, were career judges or lawyers. John Sergeant and Spencer are the
exceptions, though they were not nearly as politically distinguished as Buchanan, Van Buren and
Wright. Significantly, the practice of emphasizing the legal credentials of potential justices was
institutionalized only after the Civil war, when the executive department was generally controlled
by ex-Whigs.
Respect for the separation of law and politics may also be manifested by a general
understanding that justices should not engage in ordinary partisan behaviors. Americans at the
dawn of the twenty-first century expect that Supreme Court justices will not campaign for elected
offices, will not assist in campaigns for elected offices even to the extent of merely making their
voting preferences known, or actively participate in any legislative matter that does not directly
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involve judicial procedure. These canons of judicial behavior are often honored in the breach.203
Still, no member of the present Supreme Court is publicly known to be engaging in any of these
prescribed activities.
No general consensus existed before the Civil War that federal justices ought to fully
remove themselves from partisan activities. Although the judicial role was generally understood
as requiring a certain discreteness, Jacksonian and Whig Supreme Court justices routinely
socialized with leading politicians, many of whom were also members of the Supreme Court
bar.204 Taney Court justices regularly corresponded on political issues and strategy with partisan
leaders, as well as engaging in other political activities that would violate numerous contemporary
canons of judicial ethics.205 Scattered complaints aside, the antebellum polity did not consider
unethical Justice McLean’s efforts to run for the presidency while on the Court or Justice Catron’s
managing presidential campaigns from the bench. “Don’t believe that I have any squeamishness
on the Judgeship score,” Catron informed James K. Polk during the 1844 campaign. “One of my
brethren is openly seeking the Presidency, & founds himself on this ground as a Judge, and is
praised for his patriotism.”206
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These blurring of the lines between law and politics do not demonstrate that Jacksonian
politicians understood law as mere partisan politics. Several elements of judicial politics during
the second party system demonstrate an understanding that judicial politics was a distinctive
activity, different in important respects from electoral, legislative or other forms of politics. Most
obviously, Jacksonians sought to place on the court justices who would articulate Jacksonian legal
and constitutional understandings. No expectation existed that the Taney Court would perform
other needed services for the Jacksonian coalition. Supreme Court appointments were not made
for the purpose of improving the party newspaper, mobilizing more voters, or developing a
military strategy against Mexico. Jacksonians understood the Supreme Court as a legal
institution, an institution suited only to advance the legal aspirations of their political coalitions.
Other dimensions of politics were dealt with by other political institutions.
Jacksonians also scrupulously adhered to legal rules and legal understandings when
staffing the Supreme Court. Whig justices were never pressured to resign or threatened with
personal harm should they fail to do the administration’s will. At most, Jacksonians threatened
not to enforce adverse judicial decisions, a practice they believed could be justified legally. All
judicial nominees were vetted by the Senate. No Jacksonian ever suggested that a nominee who
did not obtain the required vote could nevertheless sit on the court. These practices may seem
obvious, but regimes that do not respect the difference between law and politics do not play
according to the rules when staffing their judicial systems.
Indeed, the practice of staffing the court with Jacksonian sympathizers hardly
demonstrates a desire to reduce constitutional law to mere partisan politics. Jacksonians wanted
good and virtuous justices. Like many people, they regarded as proof of one’s legal virtue
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evidence that a prospective jurist shared their constitutional vision. That Americans at the dawn
of the twentieth century may think that one could not reach Jacksonian constitutional conclusions
on purely legal grounds does not change that fact that Jacksonians thought they were engaged in
constitutional politics of the highest sort. Jacksonians during the Taney years exhibited a fairly
robust commitment to reducing the power of the federal government over the national economy.
The public messages of Jacksonian presidents, their use of the veto power, and their judicial
nominations after 1830 exhibit a consistency on certain constitutional questions that would do a
court proud. Why should we insist on claiming that a political coalition that runs on the same
platform for twenty years is engaging in mere politics when a court that demonstrated the same
consistency would be hailed for its commitment to neutral principles of constitutional law.
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